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While the role of public investment in promoting economic 
growth and poverty reduction is widely recognized, it is 
not clear how governments can mobilize these resources 
and use them efficiently and effectively. Exploring these 
issues in the context of agricultural and rural development 
and poverty reduction, this brief looks at current trends in 
public expenditures, strategies to raise public funding, and 
prospective reforms to increase public spending efficiency.  
Government Spending in Developing Countries 
Over the past two decades, 44 developing countries 
reported overall growth in total government expenditures 
in real terms (measured in 2000 international dollars). 
Expenditures increased from US$981 billion in 1980 to 
US$1,562 billion in 1990, an annual growth rate of 4.8 
percent. In the 1990s, government spending power 
increased by 7 percent per year. By 2000, total 
government expenditures rose to $2,969 billion, reaching 
$3,988 billion by 2004, an annual growth rate of 7 
percent between 2000 and 2004. Growth in government 
expenditures in developing countries has clearly 
accelerated. 
  Total government expenditures as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) measures the amount a 
country spends relative to the size of its economy. For 
countries in this study, the percentage increased from 20 
percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 2004.
 On average, 
developing countries spend much less than developed 
countries. For example, total government outlays as a 
percentage of GDP in the countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranged 
from 27 percent in 1960 to 48 percent in 1996, compared 
with 13–35 percent in most developing countries. 
  Among the three regions, Sub-Saharan Africa spent 
the most as a percentage of GDP—roughly 28 percent 
over the past two decades, 7 percentage points higher 
than Asia and Latin America. For Asian developing 
countries, the percentage increased from 19 percent in 
1980 to 21 percent in 2004. Latin America experienced no 
discernible spending pattern. 
  Equally important is the composition of government 
expenditures, which reflects government spending priorities 
(Table 1). The top three expenditures for Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2004 were education, health, and defense. That 
Africa and Latin America spend so little on transportation 
and communications is discouraging: the share gradually 
declined in Africa from 11 percent in 1980 to 6 percent in 
2004. The decline was even sharper in Latin America, from 
7 percent in 1980 to 2 percent in 2004. 
Agriculture is the largest sector in many developing 
countries in terms of shares of GDP and employment. 
The majority of the world’s poor live in rural areas and 
depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Therefore, 
expenditure on public goods is one of the most 
important government instruments for promoting 
economic growth and alleviating poverty in rural areas 
of developing countries. Agricultural expenditures 
increased at an annual growth rate of 3.4 percent 
between 1980 and 2004 (Table 2). During the same 
period, the rural population grew by approximately 1 
percent per year and agricultural GDP by 4.2 percent. 
That is, agricultural expenditures per capita of rural 
population increased slightly, and expenditures per unit 
of agricultural GDP decreased. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, government expenditures on 
agriculture increased gradually at an annual rate of 3.6 
percent. Agricultural expenditures in Asia more than 
doubled between 1980 and 2004 at an annual growth 
rate of 4.5 percent, the highest growth among the three 
regions. Latin America was the only region that reduced 
its spending in agriculture, with an annual reduction of 1 
percent. Seven of the 16 Latin American countries 
included in the dataset reduced their government 
expenditures in agriculture. 
  Agricultural expenditures as a share of total 
government spending indicate the level of priority a 
country gives its agricultural sector. For all regions, the 
shares declined between 1980 and 2004: in Latin 
America the share declined from 8 to 2.5 percent, in 
Asia it declined from 15 to 7.4 percent, and in Africa it 
declined from 7 to 5.3 percent. Africa’s rate is well 
below the 10 percent target established by the 
Comprehensive African Agricultural Development 
Program. 
  Agricultural expenditures as a percentage of 
agricultural GDP measure government spending on 
agriculture relative to the size of the sector. 
Agricultural spending as a percentage of agricultural 
GDP is extremely low in developing countries (less 
than 10 percent on average) compared with 
developed countries (more than 20 percent on 
average). Asia remained relatively constant at 10–11 
percent. Africa spent only half as much as Asia during 
1980–2004 (4–6 percent) and only one-third as much 
as Asia spent during the Green Revolution period. For 
Latin America, agricultural spending as a percentage 
of agricultural GDP decreased from 15 percent in 1980 
to 8 percent in 2004. 
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Table 1—Percentage Composition of Total Expenditure, 1980–2004 
  Sub-Saharan Africa     Asia     Latin America 
Sector  1980 1990 2000 2004    1980  1990  2000  2004    1980  1990  2000  2004 
Agriculture
a  7.00 5.48 3.57 5.31  14.93 12.34  7.43  7.41  8.04  2.09  2.51  2.48 
Education    14.41 14.46 14.11 15.53  13.83  17.41 14.20 11.58  10.36  7.94 14.79 14.19 
Health    4.85 4.45 6.67 7.12  5.31  4.29  4.37  3.58  5.85  6.09  7.55  8.00 
Transport and 
Communi-
cations   11.00 4.49 4.66 5.83  11.71  5.21  3.80  3.97  6.78  2.65  2.56  2.29 
Social  Security  2.86 2.51 4.95 2.76  1.89  2.43  3.14  3.08  23.65 21.81 36.38 35.81 
Defense    19.72  17.06  8.84  6.72 17.58  12.86 8.43 8.19  6.08 4.98 4.60 3.87 
Other
b  40.15 51.54 57.20 56.71  34.75  45.45  58.63  62.19  39.23  54.44  31.62  33.37 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Sources: Calculated by authors using data from International Monetary Fund's Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (various issues). 
Notes: The countries were selected largely based on data availability; they include Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte D’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In 2004, these countries accounted for more 
than 80 percent of both total GDP and agricultural GDP in developing countries.  
aIncludes agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting. 
bIncludes fuel and energy; mining, manufacturing, and construction; and general administration. 
 
Table 2—Agriculture Expenditures, 1980–2004 
  
Billion 2000  
international dollars    
Percentage of  
agricultural GDP 
Region  1980 1990 2000 2004    1980 1990 2000 2004
Sub- 
Saharan  
Africa 2.97  3.64  4.01  6.91  4.05  3.73  3.47 5.78




Caribbean 31.47 12.19 18.93 23.65  14.72  5.77  9.12 8.24
Total  109.94 123.03 177.14 244.48  10.37  7.93  8.85 10.35
Source: Calculated by authors using data from International 
Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (various 
issues). 
Mobilizing Resources to Support Poverty 
Reduction Efforts 
Finance for public spending has a number of sources. 
The different financing mechanisms have important 
implications not only for efficiency, but also for 
poverty reduction and distributional outcome. The 
financing options include domestic sources, such as 
savings, tax revenues (from income, corporate, value-
added taxes, and so on), and domestic nontax 
revenues (such as user fees), and foreign sources, 
such as foreign direct investment (FDI), borrowing, 
debt relief, and foreign aid (such as official 
development assistance, or ODA). 
The most effective way to boost a country’s 
resource mobilization effort is to improve its tax 
system. Tax revenue in ratio to GDP is only 18 percent 
in developing countries, while it is 38 percent for 
industrial countries. An efficient tax system will 
finance the necessary level of public spending in the 
most efficient and equitable way. It increases 
revenues by eliminating exemptions, deductions, and 
loopholes and by effectively enforcing the tax laws. 
However, in most developing countries, it is a 
challenge to establish such a system due to the 
predominant agrarian structure of the economy 
(largely informal) and the limited capacity of the tax 
administration. Traditionally, tax reforms emphasize 
indirect taxes such as the value-added tax, rather than 
the more progressive direct taxes on income or wealth 
that would generate higher tax revenue. Evidence also 
shows that taxes on agriculture should be minimized 
or even eliminated, particularly in largely agrarian 
economies, so the poor—who mostly derive their 
livelihoods from agriculture—will not be adversely 
affected. No single taxing system is best: each system 
has to be designed to fit the country’s economic, 
social, legal, and cultural context. Recent tax reform in 
Ghana introduced a system increasing the direct 
income tax, reducing the indirect tax, and decreasing 
reliance on import and export duties, which has 
increased total tax revenues and made taxes more 
amenable to the poor. 
Subnational entities also raise revenues by levying 
taxes on personal income and corporate profits, as 
well as on customs and excise duties, nonagricultural 
wealth, and interstate trade. The management of 
these revenue streams is often divided between the 
central government and its state and municipal 
counterparts. Decentralization of government powers 
has been shown to improve revenues because local 
authorities have better and more detailed knowledge 
of local conditions. However, in this sharing 
mechanism, there should be an incentive structure for 
the subnational entities to raise more revenues by 
receiving a certain percentage for local public 
provision and administration. For example, in China, 
subnational entities have an incentive to raise more 
taxes because if they increase revenues, they get a 
larger share of the pie. 
Domestic nontax revenues, such as user fees, are 
another source of public revenue, although user fees 
in some sectors can have a negative effect on the 
poor. For example, introducing user fees in the health 
sector can reduce public subsidies, resulting in more 
inequity in access to health services and in health 
outcomes. The same applies to education, where fees 
for books or uniforms may deter the very poor from 
sending their children to school. However, for public 
utilities such as electricity and irrigation, where   3
nonpoor households benefit more from access, a user 
fee is more efficient and equitable. 
Foreign aid, such as ODI, can boost public 
investment programs, but cannot replace domestic 
resource mobilization in the long run. Debt relief is 
another way of boosting expenditures of poor 
countries by diverting expenditures from debt 
payments toward sectors such as infrastructure, 
health, and education. But foreign aid and 
expenditures from debt relief have to be used 
carefully. First, the allocation of aid among different 
sectors has to be aligned with national development 
priorities. Strong programming strategies have to be 
developed in accordance with a country’s 
socioeconomic and political dimensions for foreign aid 
programs to be successful in reaching the goal of 
reducing poverty and hunger. Careful analyses must 
be conducted to provide evidence-based knowledge 
and information for policymakers and political 
institutions to determine what allocations to make. 
Second, too much foreign aid can lead to other 
dangers. Scarce local human resources can be used 
up quickly servicing multiple development programs 
that simply serve individual donor interests. As a 
result, fewer people are employed in productive 
activities. Moreover, the danger always exists that 
governments will spend more time being accountable 
to donors than to their own people, thus spending less 
money and time addressing the needs of the rural 
poor. Finally, when policy design, analysis, and 
management skills are inadequate, development 
activities will continue to demand a high price tag, as 
countries resort to hiring expensive foreign expatriates 
or consultants to do the job. Many donors have 
moved their aid from project/program support to 
budget support. This is a good way to ensure that 
donor support will align with the priorities of the 
national development strategies. Again, national 
capacity in setting spending priorities is crucial to 
improving the effectiveness of budget support. Donors 
may need to earmark special funds to build up the 
long-term capacity for formulating and implementing 
national development strategies and public spending 
programs. 
Public–private partnership is another critical 
instrument for mobilizing private investment to 
promote economic growth and poverty reduction. The 
public sector is the dominant supplier of health, 
education, infrastructure, and technology services in 
many developing countries. Inefficiencies are 
widespread and arise from endemic problems with 
poor staff incentives and a lack of financial autonomy, 
accountability, and transparency. Privatization can be 
an effective way to improve efficiency. Private firms 
have a stronger incentive to build and run 
infrastructure industries in cost-effective ways and to 
be more responsive to end-user needs, as long as 
privatization goes hand in hand with the development 
of market institutions and contracting mechanisms 
that exert competitive pressure on the private firms. 
The extent to which such institutions can be put in 
place will also vary with the types of services and 
infrastructure to be provided: for example, the ability 
to recover costs differs by the type of service or 
infrastructure. Privatization also encourages and 
facilitates the imposition of cost-covering tariffs or 
user fees, thus addressing the problems of 
underpricing that have afflicted many publicly 
provided infrastructure services. Greater efficiency and 
cost recovery allow firms to make investments and 
provide services that might not otherwise have been 
possible. They simultaneously improve efficiency and 
the government’s fiscal condition by making available 
the same quality and quantity of service with smaller 
budgetary subsidies. But privatization is not a 
panacea. Policymakers should consider both efficiency 
and equity implications when deciding what and how 
to privatize. 
How to Improve Public Spending Efficiency 
Public expenditures, regardless of their benefits and 
distribution, impose a cost on society, diverting 
resources from private use and resulting in 
deadweight losses associated with distortional taxation 
(that is, the “marginal cost of public funds”). For 
example, one study estimated that each unit of public 
expenditure raised in Africa had, on average, a social 
cost of $1.17. If the social return of a project is 
smaller than the marginal cost of public funds, it is not 
worth investing in that project. 
Efficiency of public spending is defined as 
achieving the maximal outcome given the same unit 
of spending. It can be further disaggregated into 
allocative efficiency and technical efficiency. Allocative 
efficiency reaches a maximum when the spending 
outcome is maximized by reallocating public spending 
among different sectors or functions. To do this, 
information is needed on the relative returns to 
different expenditures. In assessing their effects, two 
issues are particularly worth noting. First, it is critical 
to assess the impact of spending through all channels. 
For example, investment in rural infrastructure may 
affect agricultural productivity, rural nonfarm sectors, 
rural–urban migration, and food prices, and all of 
those, in turn, will contribute to overall economic 
growth, poverty reduction, and income distribution 
among different population groups. Second, more 
spending items should be included and assessed 
jointly, so their returns can be compared and their 
complementarities and interactions can be considered.  
To improve allocative efficiency, public spending 
needs to be reallocated from low- to high-return 
sectors and regions (see the Fan, Brzeska, and Shields 
brief in this series). To improve technical efficiency of 
public spending, the efficacy of spending in sectors 
where returns are low needs to be improved by 
reforming public institutions and governance. Simply 
increasing the amount of resource flows into poor 
sectors is insufficient without adequate checks and 
balances to ensure that resources and investments 
are being made effectively. In other words, are 
governance structures and institutions sufficient to   4 
ensure that the planning, implementation, and 
monitoring of development processes is transparent 
and that policymakers are highly accountable? Since 
good governance also means having in place 
institutional incentives for private-sector growth, are 
there well-established and transparent “rules of the 
game” to encourage economic activities with 
domestic, regional, and international markets? 
Uganda, for example, has reduced poverty and 
hunger rates rapidly over the past decade, thanks to 
an improved governance and policy environment, 
improved bureaucratic and management structures, 
greater transparency in decisionmaking, and overall a 
conducive environment for private-sector growth. The 
quality of governance structures and existing 
institutions in each country will determine how well 
policies and development strategies will ultimately 
reduce poverty. For example, the service delivery 
mechanisms may work far more efficiently at a 
decentralized level and through traditional institutions. 
However, centralized systems will be more cost 
effective and efficient for the delivery of large public 
works such as roads, electricity, and irrigation.  
Social security expenditures are important to the 
development process, particularly in protecting the 
welfare of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups. This type of spending can also help achieve long-
term growth and poverty reduction by improving the 
productivity of the poor. There are synergies between 
social protection and pro-poor agricultural growth. 
Another important reform that can increase the 
public resources available to invest in more productive 
sectors is to reduce government subsidies on inputs 
and output. In India, initial subsidies on credit, 
fertilizer, and irrigation helped farmers, especially 
smallholders, to adopt new technologies. Small farms 
are often losers in the initial adoption stage of a new 
technology because the increased supply of 
agricultural products from large farms benefiting from 
the new technologies pushes prices down. These 
initial subsidies helped small farmers to access the 
new technologies and therefore also gain in this initial 
stage. Eventually, however, these subsidies will yield 
low marginal returns in both agricultural growth and 
poverty reduction, despite their large impact in earlier 
decades. To sustain long-term growth in agricultural 
production and therefore achieve a long-term solution 
to poverty, government should cut subsidies and 
increase investments in agricultural research and 
development, rural infrastructure, and education. 
The Way Forward 
Many developing countries have committed to poverty 
reduction by developing national strategies and by 
committing financial resources to these efforts. How 
can governments mobilize these resources and use 
them efficiently and effectively? First, developing 
countries need to increase their tax revenues by 
reforming their tax systems, so the dependence on 
foreign aid can be reduced. A simple, transparent, and 
direct taxing system is often more efficient and 
equitable than a more complex, indirect system. 
Second, the government should cut subsidies on 
inputs and output and increase investments in 
agricultural research and development, rural 
infrastructure, and education. Third, reforms in 
institutions and governance related to public spending 
are urgently needed. A decentralized, participatory, 
and evidence-driven governance structure is 
necessary for efficient and pro-poor government 
spending. 
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